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Abstract
The present notes summarise the oligopoly dynamics lectures professor Lu´ıs Cabral
gave at the Bank of Portugal in September and October 2017. The lectures discuss
a set industrial organisation problems in a dynamic environment, namely learning
by doing, switching costs, price wars, networks and platforms, and ladder models of
innovation. Methodologically, the materials cover analytical solutions of known points
(e.g., δ = 0), the discussion of firms’ strategies based on intuitions derived directly
from their value functions with no model solving, and the combination of analytical
and numerical procedures to reach model solutions. State space analysis is done for
both continuous and discrete cases. All errors are my own.
1 Learning by doing
1.1 Motivation
Learning by doing, or learning economies, was first documented in the aviation industry. In
1965, Boeing and PanAm agreed on the development of a new, wide body aircraft, the B747.
Days later, F. Kolk from American Airlines sends manufacturers his own specifications.
These were for a smaller plane than the 747. Lockheed, a military contractor and the
inventors of most supersonic technology decided to enter the race. So does McDonnell
Douglas and first proposals were submitted by September 1967. All three planes were similar,
leading to fierce competition for launch orders. The average difference between orders during
the initial period was estimated to be in the $100,000 value for prices that fell in the $15-
17m range, less than 20% above their cost. Basically, the situation was that of a Bertrand
competition model.
∗ISEG, U. of Lisbon<bmpimentel@iseg.ulisboa.pt>.
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Benefiting from being first delivering the design, Boeing took the initial lead. The main
rival, Lockheed, made a splash with its technologically sophisticated design and thus captures
a significant share of the market for itself. Pilots in particular, were keen about the Lockheed
L1011. The Lockheed plane used British Rolls-Royce engines and as this supplier ran into
trouble, Lockheed began experiencing long delays in its L1011 deliveries. This led to order
cancellations and increase in the market share of Boeing. With a greater number of orders,
Boeing benefit from a learning curve effect, making itself more competitive which lead to a
self-reinforcing dynamic. Lockheed attempted a comeback but it was too late.
It is a well-documented fact that aircraft production costs significantly decline with cumu-
lative production (η ≈ −0.3). Under these conditions, an early lead may lead to a sustained
lead with hyper-competition in initial stages and market power at later stages. That was
the case of the wide body aircraft industry from the late 1960s to the 1990s. By the mid-
1980s both Lockheed and McDonnell Douglas had exited the market. Only Boeing and the
EU-backed entrant Airbus remained in operation in the wide body aircraft market.
1.2 General model
The assumptions for the learning by doing model are as follows:
• infinite discrete periods, discount factor δ;
• two sellers, one consumer per period;
• state (i, j: cumulative sales by firms i and j);
• timing (within each period):
– firms simultaneously set prices p(i, j);
– consumer makes purchase
– state is updated according to sales
• equilibrium concept: Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE).
The learning by doing effect is modelled under the assumptions
(i) c(i+ 1) < c(i) for m > i > 0;
(ii) c(i) = c(m) for i > m.
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The consumer buys a single unit per period with no outside option. The sale generates
ζi value for firm i so that ξi = ζi − ζj is the difference in value firm i gets in relation to firm
j from selling . F (ξ) is the c.d.f. of ξi under the following assumptions
(i) F (ξ) is the c.d.f. and is continuously differentiable;
(ii) the p.d.f. is symmetric so that f(ξ) = f(−ξ);
(iii) f(ξ) > 0, ∀ξ;
(iv) F (ξ)/f(ξ) is strictly increasing.
Furthermore, the consumer chooses firm i iff ζi−p(i, j) ≥ ζj−p(j, i). This happens with
probability q(i, j), so that the demand faced by firm i is q(i, j) = 1 − F (P (i, j)). As the
price of i increases, its demand q(i, j) decreases. We will define the price difference between
i and j as being equivalent to
P (i, j) ≡ p(i, j)− p(j, i) (1)
Also
• P (j, i) = −P (i, j);
• q(j, i) = F (P (i, j));
• dq(i, j)/dp(i, j) = −f(P (i, j)).
Writing down the Bellman equation for firm i’s value function and the respective first-
order conditions we have
v(i, j) =
(
1− F (P (i, j))
)(
p(i, j)− c(i) + δv(i+ 1, j)
)
+ F
(
P (i, j)
)
δv(i, j + 1) (2)
where
(
1−F (P (i, j))
)
is i’s demand if it sells, p(i, j) is the price, c(i) the unit cost, and
δv(i + 1, j) the discounted increased value from selling. If firm i is unable to sell, then it
faces no demand in the period F
(
P (i, j)
)
and firm j is the one increasing in future value
δv(i, j + 1).
Taking the first order condition we have that
0 = 1− F (P (i, j))− f
(
P (i, j)
)(
p(i, j)− c(i) + δv(i+ 1, j)− δv(i, j + 1)
)
. (3)
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Solving for p(i, j), we get the equilibrium price
pˆ(i, j) = c(i) +
1− F (P (i, j))
f(P (i, j))
− δw(i, j) (4)
where c(i) is the unit cost and
1
η
=
1− F (P (i, j))
f(P (i, j))
(5)
is the inverse price elasticity of demand. The higher the elasticity, the lower the price
charged by firm i.
w(i, j) ≡ v(i+ 1, j)− v(i, j + 1) (6)
is a dynamic component representing the profit premium firm i earns over j. It is hence
the difference in between the value of i and j. There is an inter-temporal subsidy component
in the last components of (4), as firm i is willing to charge lower prices today in order to
guarantee greater future earnings. The greater the δw(i, j) terms, the smaller the price and
the more significant the current price subsidy for future earnings is.
The motion equations linking the prices of firms i and j then are
pˆ(i, j) = c(i) +
1− F (P (i, j))
f(P (i, j))
− δw(i, j)
pˆ(j, i) = c(j) +
1− F (P (j, i))
f(P (j, i))
− δw(j, i)
from (1) we get that
Pˆ (i, j) = c(i)− c(j) +
1− 2F (P (i, j))
f(P (i, j))
− δ
(
w(i, j)− w(j, i)
)
(7)
where c(i) − c(j) is cost difference and
(
w(i, j) − w(j, i)
)
is the difference-in-difference
in profits of the two firms 1. Let then
K ′(P (i, j)) = C(i, j)− δW (i, j) (8)
where C(i, j) ≡ c(i)− c(j) and W (i, j) ≡ w(i, j)−w(j, i). K ′(x) is monotonic such that
K ′(x) > 0 and K(0) = 0.
1from equation (6)
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Modelling the pricing dynamics, suppose, without loss of generality, that i ≥ j. Then
the probability that the next sale goes to the leader i, thus further increasing its dominance
is q(i, j) > q(j, i) iff
C(i, j)− δW (i, j) < 0. (9)
Equation (9) shows that two factors are at play when determining the dominance of firm
i. First, a cost advantage over j is secured if the first component is such that C(i, j) ≤ 0.
Second, price cutting incentives exist such that W (i, j) ⋚ 0. The greater the desire for form
i to win the next sale, the larger this term will be. The combination of the two terms gives
an interpretation that is analogous to the classic mechanics principle of least action.
We conclude the analysis of the general model by going back to the value function, now
in equilibrium
vˆ(i, j) = H(P (i, j)) + δv(i, j + 1) (10)
where
H(x) ≡
(
1− F (x)
)2
f(x)
. (11)
Firm i’s equilibrium value is thus dependent on todays prices – via the H(P (i, j)) term
– and tomorrow’s hyper-competitive outlook – given by j+1. Equation (11) corresponds to
the “static” equilibrium profit. The continuation value equals that from losing the current
sale. This is a Bertrand style of competition: any extra gain is competed away in a price
war. As a final methodological point, note that the vˆ(i, j) value function can be solved
sequentially.
1.3 Increasing dominance and hyper-competition
We now explore an increasing dominance by a market leader using a two-step learning case.
If firm i, the current leader, has experience its marginal cost is c(i) = c(1), ∀i ≥ 1. As before,
only another firm exists, the laggard. This yield four possible scenarios, under which both,
none, the leader, or the laggard benefit from experience
v(1, 1) =
H(0)
(1− δ)
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v(0, 1) =
H(P (0, 1))
(1− δ)
v(1, 0) =
δH(0) + (1− δ)H(P (1, 0))
(1− δ)
v(0, 0) =
(1− δ)H(0)− δH(P (0, 1))
(1− δ)
since P (j, i) = −P (i, j), we have only one unknown. Also, the master motion equation
implies an unique solution for the system. Under these conditions, an increase in dominance
will occur because the market leader is more likely to make the sale than the laggard. That
is,
P (1, 0) = p(1, 0)− p(0, 1) < 0. (12)
To proof the previous proposition we turn to the difference-in-difference in the profits
between the leader and laggard firms. This is given by the difference in equilibrium profits
from only the leader and the leader and the laggard having experience
W (1, 0) = H(1, 0)−H(1, 1) =
(
1− F (P (1, 0))
)2
f(P (1, 0))
−
(1− F (0))2
f(0)
. (13)
Hence
P (1, 0) +
2F (P (1, 0))− 1
f(P (i, j))
+
(
1− F (P (1, 0))
)2
f(P (1, 0))
−
(1− F (0))2
f(0)
= c(1)− c(0) (14)
where the L.H.S. of (14) is strictly increasing in P (1, 0) = 0 when P (1, 0) = 0 and the
R.H.S. is strictly negative, that is, P (1, 0) < 0. Hence, a unique solution exists and confirms
the conjecture that the experienced firm faces lower costs than those of the laggard. The
intuition is that the cost difference clearly benefits the leader. However, we still need to
analyse the profit implications in W . The profit D.I.D. for the leader is
W (1, 0) = w(1, 0)− w(0, 1) (15)
= (v(1, 0)− v(1, 1))− (v(1, 1)− v(0, 1)) (16)
which contemplates the scenario under which the leader wins the next sale (the first term
of 16) and the case in which the previous laggard now wins the sale (the second term of the
equation). Hence, leader dominance increases in W (1, 0) > 0 iff
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v(1, 0) + v(0, 1) > v(1, 1) + v(1, 1) (17)
that is, only if the profits of one firm being in state 1 are greater than the profits of the
two being in state 1 (being experienced).
In order to explore the hyper-competition scenario, we analyse the case of a steeper
learning curve, so that c(1) is lower. Let us fix c(0) and lower the value of c(1). What
happens to the equilibrium pay-offs? Results will show that if costs decrease, so will firm
value, with v(0, 0) being strictly increasing in c(1). This means the value of both firms will
be lower should none benefited from a learning effect. Formalising the proof
P (1, 0) =
2F (P (1, 0))− 1
f(P (i, j))
+
(
1− F (P (1, 0))
)
f(P (1, 0))
−
(1− F (0))2
f(0)
= c(1)− c(0) (18)
implies that P (1, 0) is increasing in c(1). When the firms have no experience we have
v(0, 0) =
(1− δ)H(0)− δH(P (0, 1))
(1− δ)
(19)
which implies that v(0, 0) is increasing in P (1, 0) = −P (0, 1).
This hyper-competitive result may be better understood with the example of a first price
auction in which the winner gets π and the loser pays −π. Both bidders are forced to bid.
The equilibrium bid in the auction will be 2π (π − 2π for the winner and −π − 0 for the
loser). In the present context, the equilibrium continuation value is value conditional on
losing the sale. A steeper learning curve implies a higher pay-off for leader and lower pay-
off for the laggard. This is the classical Bertrand trap: the strategic effect exactly cancels
the direct effect. With an even steeper learning curve we face a Bertrand supertrap: the
strategic effect outweighs the direct effect, leaving the firms worse off should when entering
the auction. In this case, the benefit from a cost reduction (the direct effect) is more than
cancelled by the strategic effect that directs incentives both firms to lower their prices in an
attempt to capture a larger share of the market.
Recent research attempts shed some light on the effect of corporate forgetting, that is, an
increase in unitary costs from not producing a good. Empirical evidence suggests forgetting
is an important phenomenon. However, the mathematical modelling of a forgetting effect has
lead to multiple outcomes that are harder to make sense of. Analytical results are difficult
to obtain, so numerical methods, especially homotopy have been attempted to moderate
success.
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1.4 Predatory pricing
We now move to the dynamics of predatory pricing. A firm may reduce its prices in an
attempt to destroy its rivals or to deter new entry. The model’s assumptions are
• In each period nature determines a firm’s avoidable fixed cost, either 0 (Prα) or iA
(Pr 1− α), where A is a very large fixed cost;
• firms simultaneously decide wether to remain active or exit, with exit being irreversible;
• if both firms are active, then they simultaneously set price;
• let
– x˜ be the equilibrium value of x in fixed cost case;
– xˆ be the equilibrium value of x in no fixed cost (no exit) case;
– v˜(i) be the monopoly value function.
Using the previous assumptions, suppose that α is infinitesimally small, v˜(1) ≫ v(1, 1)
and A = v(0, 1). This is the case in which the fixed cost is virtually impossible to avoid, so
the value of a single firm operating in monopoly (v˜(1)) is much greater than the value of a
duopoly. In this case, an equilibrium with exit at (0, 1) exists if the fixed cost is positive.
Moreover, large price differences exist, with the leader charging a significantly lower price
P˜ (1, 0) < P (1, 0). In the limit, as α→ 0
v˜(1, 1) → v(1, 1)
v˜(0, 1) → 0
v˜(1, 0) → v˜(1)
Therefore, in the limit as α→ 0
W˜ (1, 0) → (v˜(1)− v(1, 1))− (v˜(1, 1)− 0)
W˜ (1, 0) = v˜(1)− 2v(1, 1)
which is positive and independent of P˜ (1, 0). Generically, the price difference P (1, 0) is given
by
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K(P (i, j)) = C(i, j)− δW (i, j) (20)
whereK(x) is strictly increasing andK(0) = 0. If no exit takes place, W˜ (i, j) is increasing
in Pˆ (1, 0) and zero if Pˆ (1, 0) = 0. In the case of exit W˜ (i, j) > 0 and independent of P˜ (1, 0).
It therefore follows that P˜ (1, 0) < Pˆ (1, 0).
In equilibrium rational entry occurs if a positive value for the monopolist exists, that is,
if v˜(0, 0) > 0. Predatory behaviour occurs if P˜ (1, 0) < Pˆ (1, 0) (the Ordover-Willig model
result). This means that price aggressiveness is higher because exit is a possibility. Exit is
rational for the prey of predatory pricing, as v˜(0, 1) = 0 with Pr 1− α.
We find an equilibrium with entry, predation, and exit by rational players without a need
to resort to asymmetric information assumptions. In equilibrium, the p < MC is neither a
necessary nor a sufficient condition for predation with multiple equilibrium being possible
and, in fact likely. For this reason, the overall welfare effects of predation are ambiguous.
A number of views on predation have been put forward over the years. The Chicago school
view is one of complete information in which no subgame perfect equilibrium with predation
exists. A second take, by Migrom and Roberts [19], considers the existence of bootstrap
equilibria. In equilibrium, the prey exits because it expects the predator to continue to set
a low p in the future and the predator sets a low p in the expectation that the prey will exit.
Under asymmetric information, two explanations for predatory pricing may be consid-
ered. The first is to create a reputation for toughness, as argued by Kreps and Wilson [18],
under which the predator sets a low price in order to drive out current rivals and preempt
potential entry by other firms. The second is the deep purse argument of Bolton and Scharf-
stein [7], by which a predator sets a low price in order with the prospects of depleting the
prey’s profits and cash reserves. In this scenario, the prey will have a constrained access to
financing, this exiting the market.
Finally, a number of predation models take advantage of dynamic profit functions to
model scenarios of learning by doing, switching costs, and network effects. With qit influenc-
ing profits πj,t+1 and with uncertainty concerning the future profit levels, aggressive pricing
at time t increases the probability of rival exit at time t+1. Examples of such models include
Cabral and Riordan [10] and Besanko, Doraszelski, and Kryukov [4].
Summarising, we saw how learning curves lead to three important effects. First, they
increase dominance of the leader over the laggard by price convergence or divergence. Second,
learning may induce hyper-competition as reductions in firms’ costs lead to decreased firm
value. Third, they also stimulate predatory pricing practices, under which lower prices by
9
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one firm push down the learning curve and increase chances of higher future market shares
(or monopoly). These effects are of more general applicability: profit functions with inter-
temporal dependencies.
2 Switching Costs
2.1 Motivation
Switching costs refer to impediments customers face when changing suppliers. Switching
costs arise when exit fees, search costs, learning costs, cognitive effort, emotional costs,
equipment costs, installation and start-up costs, financial risk, psychological risk, and social
risk exist. Switching costs will vary with the intensity of rivalry in the industry. Economic
theory and empirical results show that large switching costs reflect the market power of
incumbents. However, in customer markets where the number of customers is relatively
small and the seller has considerable information about the buyer, switching costs may
induce competition rather than hamper it. Examples of such b2b markets include the ready-
mixed concrete, the enterprise software and the tug boat push service industries. In such
markets, although there is a list price (a rack rate), each customer receives a idiosyncratic
discount. The final price then depends on the customer’s ability to pay and bargaining
power.
2.2 General Model
The model assumptions are
• infinite periods, two sellers, one buyer
– sellers discriminate between locked-in and non locked-in buyers;
– this implies that there will exist one single buyer for each price;
• timming within each period
– sellers simultaneously set prices;
– nature generates buyers i.i.d. preference shocks (utility) ζi(i = 1, 2);
– buyers purchases one unit from one of the sellers and pays switching cost s if the
seller is different from previous period seller;
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• symmetric Markov equilibria, where state is
– the buyer’s observed preferences;
– identity of ”incumbent”, lock-in seller (the seller previously chosen by the buyer).
The buyer’s preferences are such that the outside option is not feasible (worth −∞) and
thus it buys one unit from one seller. There is a relative preference for firm i at time t: ξit,
where the relative preference for one seller is ξ = ξi − ξj i = A,B; t ∈ N . ξit ∼ F (ξit) i.i.d.,
buyer’s private information is ξjt = −xiit, i 6= j.
The cumulative distribution of the buyer’s preferences ξit is
• continuously differentiable;
• symmetric around zero: f(x) = f(−x);
• such that it has a positive density: f(x) > 0, ∀x;
• unimodal: f(x) has one mode (at zero);
• such that it has a monotone hazard rate (MHR): F (x)/f(x) is strictly increasing.
Final assumption comes from the fact that the MHR implies the following to be strictly
increasing in x
F (x)2
f(x)
,
F (x)− 1
f(x)
,
2F (x)− 1
f(x)
. (21)
Moreover, the following is increasing in x iff x > 0 and constant at x = 0
(1− F (x))2 + (F (x))2
f(x)
. (22)
In the model, preferences are serially uncorrelated. That means that past preferences,
not purchases, are temporally independent. An iPhone owner may prefer an Android phone
today, even if she doesn’t make a purchase of a phone today. We will also be dropping
the t subscript and replacing the i = A,B with i = 0, 1 to denote ”outsider” or ”insider”
state. Given symmetry, customers do not care about continuation value. Hence, a buyer will
choose the ”insider” iff its unobservable preferences for firm 1 are ξ1−p(1) ≥ p(0)−s, where
s is the switching cost. Let us also define x ≡ p(1)− p(0)− s as the insider’s relative price
adjusted by switching costs. Then, the demand faced by the outsider firm 0 is q(0) = F (x),.
Demand for the insider is then q(1) = 1− F (x).
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The insider seller optimization process occurs along its value function
v(1) = (1− f(x))(p(1) + δv(1)) + F (x)δv(0). (23)
Its F.O.C. is
−f(x)(p(1) + δv(1)) + (1− F (x)) + f(x)δv(0) = 0 (24)
and the optimal prices for both firms are
p(1) =
1− F (x)
f(x)
− δ(v(1)− v(0)) (25)
p(0) =
F (x)
f(x)
− δ(v(1)− v(0)) (26)
where v(1)− v(0) is the investment effect from switching. The results from (25) and (26)
are equivalent to the well-known elasticity rule2 ǫ1 ≡ −f(x)
p(1)
1−F (x)
. Two effects are therefore
present: a harvesting and an investment effect. The switching costs increase the rigidity of
demand and that leads to a desire for greater unit margins by the sellers. On the other hand,
in order to create switching costs, firms need to increase the v(1)− v(0) component so that
the customers do not invest in the alternative offer in the future.
In equilibrium, we get the following value functions from substitution in the F.O.C.s
vˆ(1) =
(1− F (x))2
f(x)
+ δv(0) (27)
vˆ(0) =
F (x)2
f(x)
+ δv(0). (28)
This is a dynamic version of the ”Bertrand trap”: the gain from winning a sale is bid
away, so the continuation value is v(0).
Solving the rest of the model from the F.O.C.s
p(1) =
1− F (x)
f(x)
− δ(v(1)− v(0)) (29)
p(0) =
F (x)
f(x)
− δ(v(1)− v(0)). (30)
2that is, ǫ = −∂Q
∂P
P
Q
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We defined x ≡ p(1)− p(0)− s. Taking the differences from the F.O.C.s
x =
1− 2F (x)
f(x)
− s (31)
which, given increasing F (x)/f(x) implies an unique solution for x. Moreover, x is
decreasing in s and so q(1) is increasing in s. Intuitively, the probability of an insider selling
on the current period positively depends on the switching cost s.
2.3 Numerical model simulation
Suppose the preference shocjs follow F (x) a standardized normal distribution. With 2F (x)−1
f(x)
being strictly increasing, we can use the intermediate value theorem to find the unique
numerical solution x to LHS(x) = 0 where
LHS = x+
2F (x)− 1
f(x)
+ s. (32)
The Julia script, with the Distributions extension, is then
us ing D i s t r i bu t i on s
F(x ) = cd f (Normal (0 , 1 ) , 1000) # Normal cd f
f ( x ) = pdf (Normal (0 , 1 ) , 1000) # Normal pdf
xL = −1e3 # I n i t i a l bounds o f x
xH = +1e3
x = (xL + xH)/2 # Try middle va lue o f x
s = 5 # Value f o r s
LHS = x + (2 + F(x) − 1)/ f ( x ) + s
while (abs (LHS) > 1e−5) # Main loop ; p r e c i s i on = 1x10ˆ(−5)
i f (LHS > 0) # I f LHS>0, root must be to the l e f t
xH = x
else
xL = x
end
p r i n t l n (x )
end
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2.4 Effect of s on competition
Higher switching costs lead to higher prices for the insider so that p(1) > p(0). If we define
the average price as
p¯ ≡ p(0)q(0) + p(1)q(1) (33)
where demand q(0, 1) is a probability. Then
Proposition 1. There exist values s′, s′′, where 0 < s′ < s′′ <∞ so that
(a) s < s′, then average price p¯ is decreasing in switching cost s
(b) s > s′′, the average price p¯ is increasing in switching cost s.
To prove the proposition we start by taking the differences from the value functions
V ≡ v(1)− v(0) =
1− 2F (x)
f(x)
. (34)
Substituting this and plugging the F.O.C. into definition of p¯
p¯ = (1− F (x))
(1− F (x)
f(x)
+ δV
)
+ F (x)
(F (x)
f(x)
− δV
)
=
(1− F (x))2 + F (x)2
f(x)
+ δ
(2F (x)− 1
f(x)
)
.
The lemma implies that, at x = 0 the first term on the right hand-side is constant in x,
and the second increasing in x. Hence, if x is small, then dp¯/dx > 0; and dx/ds < 0.
The in intuition is as follows: for small switching costs s, consumers will be fairly indif-
ferent between making the switch. Specifically, for a small s, δ = 0, s→ 0, q(0) = q(1) = 1
2
.
That is, firms evenly split the market. Moreover, ∂p(1)/∂s = −∂p(0)/∂s, that is, as the
switching cost increases the insider price increases and the outsider price decreases. For this
reason, the average price p¯ remains approximately constant. The value difference v(1)−v(0)
is increasing in s, so both prices p(1) and p(0) decrease with s.
The effects for when the switching cost is large are as expected. When s is sufficiently large
demand for the outsider is basically inexistent q(0) ≈ 0 and the insider dominates the market
q(1) ≈ 1. Moreover, insider prices increase with the switching cost so that ∂p(1)/∂s > 0. In
this case, the average price p¯ increases. The corollary for these observations is that for small
switching costs, increases in s make the market more competitive, as prices decrease.
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The takeaways are that switching costs lead to a bargain-then-ripoff price pattern. Also,
switching costs magnify existing market conditions: they increase competitiveness of a al-
ready competitive markets and decrease competitiveness in little competitive markets. A
meta game whereby firms chose their own switching cost may have the nature of a prisoner’s
dilemma. Finally, switching costs may increase consumer welfare but tend to decrease social
welfare.
References
[1] A. Beggs and P. Klemperer, Multi-period competition with switching costs, Econo-
metrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, (1992), pp. 651–666.
[2] C. L. Benkard, Learning and forgetting: The dynamics of aircraft production, The
American Economic Review, 90 (2000), p. 1034.
[3] , A dynamic analysis of the market for wide-bodied commercial aircraft, The Review
of Economic Studies, 71 (2004), pp. 581–611.
[4] D. Besanko, U. Doraszelski, and Y. Kryukov, Sacrifice tests for predation in
a dynamic pricing model: Ordover & willig (1981) and cabral & riordan (1997) meet
ericson & pakes (1995), (2013). Working paper.
[5] , What drives pricing when there is learning-by-doing?, The American Economic
Review, 104 (2014), pp. 868–897.
[6] D. Besanko, U. Doraszelski, Y. Kryukov, and M. Satterthwaite, Learning-
by-doing, organizational forgetting, and industry dynamics, Econometrica, 78 (2010),
pp. 453–508.
[7] P. Bolton and D. S. Scharfstein, A theory of predation based on agency problems
in financial contracting, The American Economic Review, (1990), pp. 93–106.
[8] L. Cabral, Small switching costs lead to lower prices, Journal of Marketing Research,
46 (2009), pp. 449–451.
[9] L. Cabral, Dynamic pricing in customer markets with switching costs, Review of
Economic Dynamics, 20 (2016), pp. 43–62.
15
REFERENCES REFERENCES
[10] L. M. Cabral and M. H. Riordan, The learning curve, market dominance, and
predatory pricing, Econometrica, (1994), pp. 1115–1140.
[11] L. M. Cabral and M. Villas-Boas, Bertrand supertraps, Management Science, 51
(2005), pp. 599–613.
[12] J.-P. Dube´, G. J. Hitsch, and P. E. Rossi, Do switching costs make markets less
competitive?, Journal of Marketing research, 46 (2009), pp. 435–445.
[13] J. Farrel and P. Klemperer, Coordination and lock-in: competition with switching
costs and network effects, 2006, in Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. 3, Elsevier,
2009, ch. 30, pp. 1967–2072.
[14] J. Farrell and C. Shapiro, Dynamic competition with switching costs, The RAND
Journal of Economics, (1988), pp. 123–137.
[15] D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, Learning-by-doing and market performance, The Bell
Journal of Economics, (1983), pp. 522–530.
[16] R. J. Gilbert and D. M. Newbery, Preemptive patenting and the persistence of
monopoly, The American Economic Review, (1982), pp. 514–526.
[17] P. Klemperer, The competitiveness of markets with switching costs, The RAND Jour-
nal of Economics, (1987), pp. 138–150.
[18] D. M. Kreps and R. Wilson, Reputation and imperfect information, Journal of
Economic Theory, 27 (1982), pp. 253–279.
[19] P. Milgrom and J. Roberts, Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence, Journal
of Economic Theory, 27 (1982), pp. 280–312.
[20] A. M. Spence, Entry, capacity, investment and oligopolistic pricing, The Bell Journal
of Economics, (1977), pp. 534–544.
16
